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I. INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed on July 2 of that year,' in an
attempt to end the racial discrimination that has plagued the United States from
its beginning. The Act prohibited discrimination primarily in public
accommodations, programs receiving federal assistance, and employment. 2
However, as President Johnson signed the legislation, he knew that more was
needed to achieve the goal of racial equality, and he immediately began to push
for the next civil rights bill. He told Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach: "I want you to write me the goddamndest, toughest voting rights
act that you can devise."3 Johnson had recognized the primacy of the franchise
early in the civil rights movement and had told Hubert Humphrey during the
battle for the 1964 Act, "Yes, yes, Hubert, I want all of those other things-
buses, restaurants, all of that-but the right to vote with no ifs, ands, or buts,
that's the key." 4
This Note provides an overview of the legal response to black
disenfranchisement in the United States and focuses on recent attempts to
remedy such discrimination via the creation of state legislative and
congressional districts in which blacks comprise a majority ("majority-minority
districts"). The Note then analyzes the three cases decided by the Supreme
Court in 1993 that address majority-minority district creation.
II. HISTORY OF BLACK DISENFRANCHISEMENT
The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in 1870, provides
that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." 5 One may wonder why there was any need
to address this issue in 1964, nearly a century later. The "right to vote,"
I Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-
1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CrvIL
RIGHTs, PART If, at 1054 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
2 STATUTORY HISTORY OFTHE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 1018-20.
3 MERLE MLLER, LYNDON, AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY 371 (1980).
4 Id. (emphasis added).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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however, is not as simple as it appears. Even without inquiring into who
qualifies as a citizen, speaking of one's right to vote raises questions
concerning procedural hurdles such as registration, educational requirements
such as literacy, and the system for determining a winner (i.e., first-past-the-
post v. runoff systems). A representative democracy composed of geographic
districts raises further questions of whether to have single-member or
multimember districts and how to draw them. Even a completely neutral and
fair-minded person, when attempting to confront these issues, is haunted by
Arrow's mathematical proof that whatever system created will be imperfect. 6
The Constitution originally left virtually all decisions regarding voting to
the states.7 As more people were considered worthy of the rights traditionally
afforded only to educated, wealthy, white, male citizens, five of our twenty-
seven Constitutional amendments, including the Fifteenth Amendment
mentioned above, expanded voting rights.8 That nearly one-fifth of our
amendments address this issue affirms the belief held by many courts and
commentators (and by Lyndon Johnson) that the guaranteed right to vote is an
essential ingredient to a successful democracy. 9
6 Kenneth J. Arrow proved mathematically that a perfect voting system is not possible
because of a problem, recognized since the eighteenth century, called the "cyclical
majority." Arrow's proof has withstood critical examination and numerous attempts to
avoid his depressing conclusion. See JOHN BONNER, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
SociLA CHOICE 56-71 (1986).
7 The Constitution required only that whatever qualifications were needed to vote for
members of a state's largest legislative branch would also be needed to vote for members of
the U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Note that prior to the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, U.S. Senators were elected by members of
their state legislatures. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII.
8 In addition to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth,
and Twenty-sixth Amendments addressed voting rights. The Fourteenth Amendment, while
not expressly prohibiting the denial of voting rights to otherwise eligible black citizens,
penalized such discrimination by reducing the state's representation in the House of
Representatives in proportion to the number of 21-year-old males who were denied the right
to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Nineteenth Amendment prohibited denial of
the right to vote on the basis of sex. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1. The Twenty-fourth
Amendment disallowed the use of a poll tax as a means of withholding the right to vote in
presidential and congressional elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. This practice was
also prohibited in state elections by Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Twenty-
sixth Amendment prohibited age discrimination in voting rights against all those over 18.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
9 The right to vote "is regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is]
preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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Unfortunately, the enigmatic nature of the "right to vote," though
buttressed by numerous amendments to our Constitution, has given rise to
manipulation. Most forms of subverting the right to vote may be classified
either as attempts to prevent certain groups (usually blacks) from voting
altogether, or as attempts to dilute those groups' votes so as to render them
ineffective.
A. Racially-Applied Voting Requirements
Having gained popular support via the massive civil rights movement and
Northern outrage over Southern brutalization of black activists, 10 the voting
bill that Lyndon Johnson had so forcefully demanded was enacted as the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.11 The Act was an attempt to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment and to end the practice, mostly Southern, of applying facially
neutral voting requirements, such as literacy tests, in a discriminatory
manner. 12 Section two of the Act provided that "[n]o voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen. .. to vote on account of race or color." 13 Section three provided
strong judicial remedies, including the power to appoint federal examiners to
oversee local elections and to suspend "tests or devices" found to have "been
used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ... "14
Much of the success of the 1965 Act, however, resulted from section five.
This section applied to: (1) states that on November 1, 1964, maintained any
voting test or device (as determined by the Attorney General); (2) states in
which less than fifty percent of the voting-age population was registered to
vote; and (3) states in which less than fifty percent of the voting-age population
voted in the November 1964 presidential election.15 Although facially neutral,
section five effectively applied only to Southern states.16 "Section five states"
10IACKM. BLoOM, CLASS, RACE, &THE Cw GRiHTs MOVEMENT 184 (1987).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1992).
12 See BERNARD GROFMAN Er AL., MINORIrY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALTrY 8-10 (1992).
13 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1992)).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 438 (§ 4(b)). Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and parts of Arizona and North Carolina were covered under the
1993] 1483
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were required to receive approval from the United States Department of Justice
before enacting "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or
effect on November 1, 1964...."17 The provision was so far-reaching that it
required Justice Department approval for a section five state to change a polling
location.18
The drastic measures provided for in section five were originally seen as
temporary measures needed only until blacks were successfully integrated into
Southern political systems, and they were scheduled to expire after five
years. 19 Congress, however, amended the Act in 1970 and again in 1975 to
extend the lifespan of section five.20 The 1975 amendment also expanded the
Act's coverage to include language minorities.2' By providing for massive
Justice Department oversight of the worst states, the Voting Rights Act was
largely successful in removing barriers to the voting rights of blacks.22
B. Dilution
A single person's vote, although containing some romantic value in and of
itself, is an effective tool of democracy only when combined with many other
votes.23 In a representative democracy, this fact gives rise to the ability to make
some votes less powerful than others. The representation of the various states
in Congress provides a useful example. Representation in the U.S. Senate, in
contrast to representation in the House of Representatives, does not vary by
population. A Senator from a less populous state will therefore represent fewer
people than a Senator from a more populous state; thus voters in the less
populous states have more "power" in the Senate than voters in more populous
original version of section five. Roy W. Copeland, The Status of Minority Voting Rights: A
Look at Section V Preclearance Protections and Recent Decisions Affecting Multi-member
Voting Districts, 28 HOWARD L.J. 417, 420 n.35 (1985).
17 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1992)).18 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PIMIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 123 (1988).
19 GROFMAN, supra note 12, at 19.
20 Id. at 20_21.
21 Id. at 17.
22 Cynthia Wright, The Effects of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act on Minority
Voting Practices, 28 HOWARD L.J. 589, 599-601 (1985).
23 "The right of a person to vote on an equal basis with other voters draws much of
its significance from the political associations that its exercise reflects .... "City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78 (1980).
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states. The structure of the U.S. Senate, then, does not reach the more abstract
problems of a representative democracy discovered by Arrow. 24 It plainly fails
to accord even approximately equal weight to each vote. This arrangement,
which is unique in our Constitution in that it cannot be changed without the
consent of each affected state,2 is the result of a compromise at the
Constitutional Convention to guarantee the less populous states protection from
the larger ones.26 The peculiar structure of the Senate is not the concern of this
Note ad suffice it to say that its constitutionality is not in question before the
Supreme Court.27 The disproportionate structure of the Senate does not
present the same problems as a similar structure would for state legislative or
congressional districts, because the "district" lines for the Senate are the
various state boundaries and are not subject to frequent change by those who
might use such an opportunity for political advantage.
State legislative and congressional districts, however, are redrawn
periodically and are subject to political opportunism. Responsibility for the
initial redrawing is generally placed with the state legislatures, but is in some
states given to the Governor or to a board or commission.28 Most state
legislatures that have this responsibility delegate it to a board or commission,
then vote on the plan that is developed.29 In most states, the Governor has
veto power over the plan that is finally approved by the legislature.30 Without
any judicial review, those in charge of the reapportionment process may be
tempted to create imbalances of power similar to that in the U.S. Senate, as
described above. Such opportunities existed and were acted upon prior to the
1962 Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr',31 which overturned prior
decisions that held that reapportionment challenges were nonjusticiable political
questions.32  Two years later, in 1964-the same year that the first
24 See supra note 6.
25 Article V, which sets forth the procedure for amending the Constitution, provides
that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."
U.S. CONST. art. V.
26 GORDON S. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMEmRCAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87 558
(1969).
27 The Court has held that "the federal analogy [is] inapposite and irrelevant to state
legislative districting schemes." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573 (1964).
2 8 NATONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATuRES, REDiSTRicrING PROvISIONS: 50
STATE PROFILS 105 (1989).
29 Id.
3 0 Id.
31 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3 2 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding that reapportionment
challenges presented nonjusticiable questions).
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comprehensive civil rights act became law-the Court finally addressed
substantive challenges to state legislative and congressional reapportionment
plans. In Wesberry v. Sanders,33 the Court struck down Georgia's
congressional districting plan in which some districts were nearly three times as
populous as others. The Court stated that "the command of Article I, section
two, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's." 34 In Reynolds v. Sims,3 the Court invoked
the Equal Protection Clause to establish the "one person, one vote"
requirement for state legislative districts. "Simply stated, an individual's right
to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in
a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in
other parts of the State." 36
The one-person, one-vote standard established in Wesbeny and Reynolds,
when combined with the protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
presented black voters with an unprecedented ability to participate in the
electoral process. Blacks had achieved the enforceable right to cast votes, and
their votes were equally weighted with all others. Unfortunately, there was
still room for manipulation. Although the one-person, one-vote standard
limited the ability of those in charge of reapportionment plans to accord some
votes more weight than others, it did not end other forms of vote dilution.
Racial gerrymandering was still used to render even equally weighted votes
of blacks less powerful than those of whites. States with multimember districts
could include the black population within a large district in which whites made
up the majority. Each voter in such a system receives as many votes as there
are representatives up for election in that district. To prevent minorities from
using all of their votes for one candidate, which could result in the election of
at least one representative chosen by the minority, most states enacted "anti-
single-shot" laws. 37 These provisions barred any voter from using more than
one vote per candidate.38 Given the prevalence of racially cohesive voting in
most areas of the country, whites were able to easily elect all-white
representation in such districts. 39 In states with single-member districts, large
concentrations of black voters could simply be split into small, ineffective parts
33 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3 4 1d. at 7-8.
35 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3 6 Id. at 568.
3 7 GROIAN, supra note 12, at 24.
3 8 Id. at 139-40 n.22.
39 See GROBMAN, supra note 12.
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of majority-white districts. Although these practices seemingly violated the
Voting Rights Act's prohibition against imposing a "practice, or procedure...
to deny or abridge the right... to vote on account of race or color," 40 it was
not easy for Voting Rights Act plaintiffs to obtain relief.
C. City of Mobile v. Bolden
Plaintiffs claiming redress under the Voting Rights Act for dilutive
practices met particular difficulty when the Supreme Court held in City of
Mobile v. Bolden41 that proof of discriminatory intent was a necessary element
for recovery. Noting that section two of the Voting Rights Act simply
reiterated protections granted by the Fifteenth Amendment, 42 the Bolden court
looked to prior reapportionment challenges under the Fifteenth Amendment.
Those decisions "made clear that action by a State that is racially neutral on its
face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory
purpose." 43
In 1982, in direct response to Bolden, Congress amended the Voting
Rights Act to make clear that such a showing of discriminatory intent was not
required for the Act to be violated. As amended, plaintiffs need only show that
"based on the totality of circumstances ... the political processes... are not
equally open... [to a protected class of citizens] in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. " 44 Majority-minority
district creation was not an issue in Bolden, and though the amended section
two of the Voting Rights Act explicitly rejected requiring proportional
representation of any particular group, the application of section two to such
"benign" race-conscious reapportionment is unclear. Some cases approvingly
cited by Boden would appear to invalidate any racially motivated
reapportionment. 45 The primary concern of the Boden court, however, was
40 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1).
41 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
42Id. at 60-61.
43 Id. at 62.
44 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1992).
45 The Bolden Court pointed to the failed reapportionment challenge in Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1963), because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the legislature
was "motivated by racial considerations," "drew the districts on racial lines," or
"contriv[ed] to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin." Id. at 52. (editor's case
summary). Majority-minority district creation, on the other hand, fits at the very least the
first two of those categories.
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with attempts to weaken the strength of minority votes. The Court noted that it
had "repeatedly" stated the requirement of an "invidious purpose" to support a
claim of unconstitutional reapportionment. 46 The Bolden Court's lack of
concern for reapportionment plans that increased the voting strength of
minorities become clear where it cited prior case law holding that
reapportionments violate the Fourteenth amendment if their purpose is to
"invidiously . . . minimalize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or
ethnic minorities.47
D. The Gingles Test
The "totality of the circumstances" test for a Voting Rights Act violation
was first applied in Thornburg v. Gingles,48 a challenge by black voters to the
1982 North Carolina legislative redistricting plan. The plaintiffs alleged that
their votes were diluted in one single-member and six multimember districts,
thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice in violation of
the Voting Rights Act.49 To conduct its "totality of the circumstances"
analysis, the district court utilized the Senate Judiciary Committee Majority
Report accompanying the bill that amended section two. 50 That report suggests
the following "typical factors" for use in the analysis:
1. [IThe extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2 [Ihe extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. [The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions,
or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. []f there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. [Tihe extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process;
46 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 (1980).
47 Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
48 478 U.S. 30 (1986).




6. [Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. Mhe extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction.5 1
The committee also listed the following as factors that might have probative
value in some cases to support a plaintiff's claimed violation:
[W]hether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
[Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure
is tenuous.52
In applying the test to the specific facts before it, the Gingles Court found that
the North Carolina apportionment plan violated the Voting Rights Act with
respect to the challenged multimember districts, for the following reasons: (1)
racially polarized voting existed in each of the districts; (2) there was a legacy
of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment,
and health services; (3) there were persistent campaign appeals to racial
prejudice; (4) the multidistricting scheme impaired the ability of geographically
insular and politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in
the political process and to elect candidates of their choice; and (5) the success
of a few black candidates was too recent and limited to support a finding that
the district court's analysis was clearly erroneous. 53 The "Gingles test" was
thus established whereby Voting Rights Act plaintiffs must, to state a prima
facie case, prove that: (1) the minority group "is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district";
(2) the minority group "is politically cohesive"; and (3) "that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate." 54
The Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982 and interpreted by Gingles did
not, of course, remove all barriers to equal representation for blacks. There is
still much room for improvement in, for example, voter registration rates.
Deeper problems, such as a history of inferior public education in many
predominantly black areas, also impede the ability of minorities to participate in
the political process. However, it does appear that the United States is moving
5 1 Id. at 36-37.
52 Id. at 37 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 26-28 (1982)).
53Id. at 79.
5 4 Id. at 50-51.
1489
OHIO STA7ELAWJOURNAL
toward the point when all blacks not only "register and vote without
hindrance,"55 but when black votes are also free from dilution. The question
remains as to whether this achievement means that we have reached our goal in
terms of voting rights. Does an unrestricted right to an undiluted vote present
black voters with the "key" to political equality that Johnson wanted for them?
III. BEYOND THE EQUALLY WEIGHTED VoTE
More may be needed than simply the right to an undiluted vote in racially
neutral districting schemes for blacks to achieve fair representation. Some
argue for a significant departure from current geographically based districting
schemes to enhance the representation of minority interests. 56 A less radical
approach is to create districts in which blacks comprise a majority of the
voters, thus guaranteeing the election of candidates preferred by blacks.
A comparison of political and economic rights must be made here, as
attempts to ensure both contain many similarities. Blacks in the United States
were grossly deprived of both kinds of rights in the numerous discriminatory
practices that carried on after the end of slavery. 57 With regard to economic
rights, the law progressed through three major phases: (1) allowing continued
deprivation via segregation; (2) repudiation of the "separate but equal" myth
and attempts at equality of opportunity via the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and
(3) the widespread (and indeed controversial) implementation of affirmative
action programs designed to remedy past discrimination via preferences for
blacks in such areas as employment, academic admissions, and government
contracts to ensure not only rights, but a certain degree of successful results.
The law with regard to political rights has gone through only the first two of
those same phases. Prior to Baker, v. Carr58 many forms of unequal allocation
55 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
56 Lani Guinier, a professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, who was at
one time President Clinton's nominee to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
suggests that "multimember districts and proportional or semi-proportional representation
[schemes] may work better than [majority-minority] districting as a remedy for vote
dilution," because they "do not rely on territorial or residential location as a fixed proxy for
interests." Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-
Member Disticts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1135 (1993). Amid public disapproval of
Professor Guinier's ideas about voting rights, President Clinton was forced to withdraw her
nomination. The Destruction ofLad Guinier, Cm. Tsm., June 6, 1993, at C2.57 See Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., A COMMON DESTINY:
BLACKS AND AMEmCAN SoC=ET 58-60 (1989).
58 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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of voting rights were allowed to survive under the political question doctrine.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as amended), combined with Gingles, should
succeed in creating an equal opportunity for blacks to exercise their right of
suffrage. The law regarding political rights for blacks has now begun to enter a
third phase that contains both similarities and differences with the law
regarding traditional "economic" affirmative action plans.
The third phase for the law of political rights can be characterized by
attempts not only to provide blacks with the right to an equal vote, but with
rights regarding actual state legislative and congressional electoral success.
The creation of majority-minority districts is the mechanism for providing this
success.
The argument over whether affirmative action plans were a step in the right
direction or a step backward in the attempt to provide for equality in economic
rights is not one that will be settled soon. The debate over what at first may
seem to be a "preference" for political rights is similarly not going to be a
short one. The author only wishes to point out that there are crucial differences
between traditional economic affirmative action plans and the racially conscious
creation of majority-minority districts. One commentator, doubtful of the
wisdom of affirmative action plans, asked:
(1) Can the Court insist on such intrusive use of racial classification without
teaching the country that policies based on racial classification are legitimate?
(2) Will those who are asked to step aside for the benefit of blacks not harbor
ill will against them? Will this not be a particular problem for the young, who,
having grown up on this side of the civil rights revolution, disassociate
themselves from the racism of the old America, and may be surprised to learn
that they are asked to pay for it? (3) Will the effect of pervasive affirmative
action for blacks-combined with an equal pay principle-be to ensure that
blacks are systematically promoted to the level just above their competence and
cause affirmative action to become an engine of group defimation? (4) Will
affirmative action create incentives for employers to locate jobs away from
black labor?59
Whatever the validity of those arguments against the use of traditional
affirmative action plans, many of them do not readily transfer to the creation of
majority-minority districts. No white person can claim to be the victim, or
claim to be paying for the benefit of blacks, when blacks are simply allowed to
elect representatives of their choice whenever they comprise a sufficiently
populous geographic unit. There can also be no notion of "group defamation"
59 Edmund Kitch, 7he Return of Color Consciousnes to the Con'tution: Weber,
Dayton, and Colanbus, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 12-13.
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or of blacks achieving what they do not deserve. Although our market
economy has and will continue to allocate resources unequally among people (it
is so designed, so that resources are used most efficiently), our political system
need not share this characteristic. It is not meant to reward efficiency, but to
properly represent the electorate. 60 Although it is expressly provided in the
Voting Rights Act that no racial minority can claim a right to proportional
representation, 61 even in that achievement blacks could not be said to have
undermined our democracy, as it is argued that affirmative action undermines
our system of economic rewards.
It is true, however, that conscious creation of majority-minority districts
may legitimize policies based on racial classification. The counterargument is
that such policies (which may not have been achieved if the above-quoted
commentator had had his way) are so ingrained in our society that further
legitimization will do no damage. Affirmative action plans are widespread,
though still widely debated. The most significant "racial classification" that
exists, and one that is necessary for the creation of majority-minority districts,
is housing segregation. It would seem insincere to deny that there is very little
integration between whites and blacks in housing, and similarly insincere to
deny that, as long as blacks tend to live in a geographically compact area, it is
reasonable to lasso their common interests so that they may have an effective
voice in our representative democracy.
IV. THREE NEw VOTING RIGHTS ACT HOLDINGS
Creating majority-minority districts is, of course, not without controversy.
Some challenge the practice as "reverse discrimination" and question the ability
of courts to distinguish benign from invidious racial classifications. Others
claim that creating majority-minority districts falsely assumes that all blacks
think alike and "vote as a herd." 62  Still others argue that some
reapportionment bodies have surreptitiously created majority-minority districts
to "pack" blacks into fewer districts, thus minimizing their influence. The
Supreme Court addressed these issues in three cases decided in 1993.
60 The precise goal of our representative system is not a settled issue. Some argue that
the representatives should seek to do what is "best" for the population, that our
representatives are trustees acting for the electorate's interests. Others argue that our
representatives should not make value judgments about what views are better than others,
that they are not trustees but are more like agents, and should simply vote as their
constituents would. EsKRIDGmE & FRICKEY, supra note 18, at 94.
61 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1992).
62 George F. Will, Districting by Pigmentation, NEwSWEEK, July 12, 1993, at 72.
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A. Growe v. Emison
Growe v. EMiSonS63 primarily involved the power of federal courts to
intervene in state reapportionment proceedings, 64 but also included an
63 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
64 A group of voters brought a state-court action against the Minnesota Secretary of
State, alleging that the state's congressional and legislative districts were malapportioned in
light of population shifts illuminated by the 1990 census. Id at 1076. The parties stipulated
that the current apportionments were unconstitutional, and the Minnesota Supreme Court
appointed a panel to create new apportionment plans. Id. at 1078. A second group of voters
sued in federal court on similar grounds and also included a challenge under section two of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. A panel of three federal judges was appointed to decide the
challenge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). Id. ("he statute provides that "[a] district court
of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts
or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body." 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)).
The Minnesota Legislature was designing new state legislative districts when the
federal and state actions were filed, and it adopted a reapportionment plan shortly
thereafter. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1076 (1993). The new plan was replete with
technical errors, however, forcing the Legislature to draft corrective amendments. Id. at
1078. While the enactment of the amendments was pending, another group of plaintiffs
filed a second action in federal court against the Secretary of State, alleging state and federal
constitutional violations of the adopted (but not yet corrected) plan. Id. The three-judge
district court panel agreed to defer further proceedings pending action by the Minnesota
Legislature, but refused to defer until the state court had a chance to review the
Legislature's soon-to-be corrected plan. d. at 1079. The district court set a deadline for
legislative action and directed special masters to develop contingent reapportionment plans
for both congressional and state legislative districts. Id.
Meanwhile, the special redistricting panel, appointed by the state supreme court, held
that the not-yet-corrected state legislative plan was unconstitutional and invited the parties to
submit alternative plans. Id. at 1078. Shortly thereafter, the state court issued an order
containing its legislative plan, which was to take effect if the Legislature failed to act by a
certain deadline. Id. at 1079. The federal district court panel then stayed all proceedings of
the state court and issued an injunction preventing the parties from implementing the state
court's orders, "explain[ing] its action as necessary to prevent the state court from
interfering with the Legislature's efforts to redistrict and with the District Court's
jurisdiction." Id. The Supreme Court, upon request of the state-court plaintiffs, vacated the
injunction, thus allowing the Legislature to both correct the state legislative reapportionment
plan and adopt a new congressional redistricting plan. L Both actions, however, were
vetoed by the Governor. Id. The state court issued an order adopting its state legislative
plan and began to hold hearings on competing congressional redistricting plans. Id. "Two
days later, the district court issued an order adopting its own legislative and congressional
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important holding regarding the Voting Rights Act. The district court had
concluded that minority vote dilution existed in part of Minneapolis, in
violation of section two of the Act.65 The district court reached its conclusion,
however, without applying the Gingles test, assuming that such application was
not necessary in the single-member district context.66 The Supreme Court held
that the Gingles test does indeed apply to single-member districts. 67 Stating its
preference for single-member districts for federal-court-ordered
reapportionment, because multimember and at-large district plans "generally
pose greater threats to minority-voter participation in the political process," the
Court pointed out that "[i]t would be peculiar to conclude that a vote-dilution
challenge to the (more dangerous) multimember district requires a higher
threshold showing than a vote-fragmentation challenge to a single-member
district." 68
The Court also reasoned that the basis for the Gingles preconditions applies
equally to single-member and multimember districts:
The "geographically compact majority" and "minority political cohesion"
showings are needed to establish that the minority has the potential to elect a
representative of its own choice in some single-member district. And the
"minority political cohesion" and "majority bloc voting" showings are needed
to establish that the challenged districting thwarts a distinctive minority vote by
submerging it in a larger white voting population. Unless these points are
established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy. 69
districting plans [drawn by its special masters] and permanently enjoining interference with
state implementation of those plans." Id. The district court rejected the state court's state
legislative plan on the ground that it "'fail[ed] to provide the equitable relief necessary to
cure the violation of the Voting Rights Act,' which in its view required at least one 'super-
majority minority' Senate district .... " Id. The district court also retained jurisdiction to
ensure adoption of its plans. l
The Supreme Court's primary holding, via a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Scalia, was that the district court "erred in not deferring to the Minnesota [state court]
proceedings." Id. at 1080. Although federal courts generally need not abstain from action
when they exercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter concurrently with state courts,
the reapportionment context is one of the "rare circumstances" when "principles of
federalism and comity dictate otherwise." Id. Thus the district court's injunction of state-
court proceedings, previously vacated by the Supreme Court, was clearly erroneous.
65 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1083 (1993).
66Id.
67 Id. at 1084.
68 Id
69 Id. (citations omitted).
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Because the minority population identified by the district court was comprised
of several distinct ethnic and language minority groups, and courts may not
presume bloc voting within even a single minority group, proof of political
cohesion among the various groups was "all the more essential." 70
The Court found not only that the Gingles preconditions were ignored, but
that they were also unattainable given the complete absence of evidence of
minority political cohesion (even within a single ethnic group) in the record.71
The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss. 72
B. Voinovich v. Quilter
In Voinovich v. Quilter,73 the Supreme Court addressed a three-judge
district court panel's finding that Ohio's state legislative reapportionment
violated the Voting Rights Act.74 The Court once again, in a unanimous
opinion delivered this time by Justice O'Connor, overruled a district court's
attempt to influence the apportionment process.
Ohio's Constitution provides that its state legislative districts be re-
apportioned every ten years, in the year following the federal decennial
census. 75  The reapportionment process is conducted by the Ohio
Apportionment Board, consisting of representatives of the Governor, Secretary
of State, Auditor of State, and two persons (from different parties) chosen by
the legislative leaders. 76 Republicans held a three to two majority on the 1991
Board (Governor, Secretary of State, and one legislative appointee), and
appointed the chief executive officer of the Republican-controlled Ohio Senate,
James Tilling, to be the Board's secretary. 77 The majority members directed
that Tilling draft and submit on their behalf a reapportionment plan that
complied "with all applicable federal statutes [and] with special emphasis to be
paid to conforming with the provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act."78
70 Id. at 1085. The Court assumed without deciding that distinct ethnic and language
minority groups can be combined for purposes of section two. ld.
71 Id.
7 2 Id.
73 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).74 Id. at 1151.
75 Omo CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 1, 6.
76 OHIO CONST. art. X, § 1.
77 Brief for Appellant at 3, Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ohio 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
7 8 joint Appendix at 272, Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ohio 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
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Tilling was instructed specifically to "create representative districts which
maximized the effective representation of Ohio's significant ethnic and racial
minorities." 79  Pursuant to the Board majority's instructions, and after
extensive consultation with black leaders and black elected officials, Tilling
submitted an apportionment plan that included eight majority-minority Ohio
House of Representatives districts.80 The 1981 apportionment plan included
four majority-minority Ohio House districts.81 After some minor adjustments,
the Board adopted the plan submitted by Tilling in a three to two party-line
vote.82 The plan included black voting age populations ranging from fifty
percent to sixty-five percent.83 The two dissenting members of the Board,
joined by several state representatives and other interested parties, sued in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.84 The plaintiff-appellees
alleged, inter alia, that the Board's plan violated section two of the Voting
Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. 85 The
district court held that the Board's plan impermissibly packed minority voters
in violation of the Voting Rights Act:
In the absence of [a totality of the circumstances] analysis, there can be no
reliable finding of a violation. In the absence of a violation, there was no legal
justification for the Board's "remedy" in the form of the wholesale creation of
majority-minority districts. Without such a justification, the Board's plan
packs minority voters, with dilutive effects that violate the Voting Rights
Act.86
The district court ordered -the Apportionment Board to either justify its existing
plan under the totality of the circumstances test or to submit a revised plan to
the court within twenty days. 87 The defendant-appellants, while reserving their
7 9 /8d
80 Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1993).
81 Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 707 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (Dowd, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
82 Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1993).
83 FRAN R. PARKER, Are States Permitted to Create Majority Minoity Districts when
There Is No Voting Rights Act Vwlation?, 1992-93 ABA PREvIEW OF UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT CASES 157.
84 Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1993).
85 Id.





right to appeal the court's order,88 conducted a totality of the circumstances
analysis and submitted their findings to the court.89 The Apportionment Board
submitted a slightly different plan this time, after making several minor
corrections pursuant to a separate legal challenge under the Ohio
Constitution.9" The Apportionment Board's new plan included five majority-
minority Ohio House districts, with black voting age populations ranging from
fifty-three percent to sixty-five percent. 91 The district court found the Board's
totality of the circumstances analysis insufficient to "justify its wholesale
creation of majority-minority districts, thus rendering [it] violative of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965."92 The court also summarily noted that the plan
violated the Fifteenth Amendment, enjoined the May 5, 1992 primary election,
and appointed a special master to prepare an acceptable plan.93 Appellants
moved for a stay of the order, and in an order denying the motion, 94 the
district court expounded upon its prior analysis and found that the Board's plan
had also violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 The appellants' application to
the Supreme Court for a stay of the district court order was granted, 96 and the
1992 election was conducted using the Board's amended plan. 97
In addressing the alleged Voting Rights Act violation, the Supreme Court
first distinguished the Quilter plaintiffs' "influence dilution" claim from the
typical section two claim that the complaining group was deprived of a certain
number of districts in which the group comprises a majority. While
specifically not deciding whether such influence dilution claims are cognizable
under section two, the Court assumed arguendo that they are.98
Next, the Court rejected the district court's holding that section two
88 Brief for Appellants at 17, Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ohio
1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
89 Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 756, 756 (N.D. Ohio 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1149 (1993).90 See Voinovich v. Ferguson, 586 N.E.2d 1020 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the plan
violated the Ohio Constitution by unnecessarily splitting political subdivisions).
91 PARKER, supra note 83, at 158.
92 Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 756, 756 (N.D. Ohio 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1149 (1993).
93 Id.
94 Quilter v. Voinovich, No. 5:91 CV 2219 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 24, 1991) (order denying
motion for stay), reprinted in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 127a, Quilter v.
Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ohio 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
95 Id. at 146a.
96 Voinovich v. Quilter, 112 S. Ct. 1663 (1992).
9 7 PARKER, supra note 83, at 158.
98 Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (1993).
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"prohibits the creation of majority-minority districts unless such districts are
necessary to remedy a statutory violation." 99 On the contrary, the Court
emphasized that reapportionment "is the domain of the States," 100 that "States
do not derive their reapportionment authority from the Voting Rights Act, but
rather from independent provisions of state and federal law," 10 and that
"courts are bound to respect the States' apportionment choices unless those
choices contravene federal requirements. " 102 Finally, the Court noted that the
three Gingles preconditions for a Voting Rights Act violation apply to single-
member as well as multimember districts,' 0 3 and that the third factor, sufficient
white majority bloc voting to frustrate the election of the minority group's
candidate of choice, was not present here. In asserting their claim, the Court
noted, the plaintiffs in Quilter expressly denied the existence of racial bloc
voting. 104 They claimed that the absence of such bloc voting precluded the
Apportionment Board from attempting to "remedy" a Voting Rights Act
violation. The fundamental error with this argument, confirmed by the Court's
holding, is that in the absence of racial bloc voting, any attempt to fracture the
minority vote would be fruitless. There would be no "minority vote" to
fracture. In the absence of racial bloc voting, an attempt to increase the
minority percentage in certain districts may be unwise in that it would serve no
purpose. It could not be said, however, to have diluted the votes of minorities
in violation of the Voting Rights Act. Thus the Court reversed the district
court's finding of a section two violation. 10 5
The Court next addressed the district court's finding that the
reapportionment plan violated the Fifteenth Amendment because the
Apportionment Board intentionally diluted minority voting strength. The Court
reserved the question of whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote
dilution claims, noting that it has never held any legislative apportionment
inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.106 Assuming that the Fifteenth
Amendment does apply to dilution claims, the Court here found the district
court clearly erroneous in its factual finding of intentional discrimination.' 0 7
99 Id. at 1156.
100 Id. at 1157.
10I Id. (quotation omitted).
102 Id.
103 Per the Court's decision in Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993). See supra
notes 63-72.






The district court had found intentional discrimination when: (1) Tilling
disregarded the Ohio Constitution when he believed it conflicted with the
Voting Rights Act; and (2) Tilling possessed documents prepared by
Democrats speculating how Republicans might take partisan advantage of the
Voting Rights Act.' 08 The Court found that Tilling's disregard of the Ohio
Constitution was merely obedience to the Supremacy Clause and that the record
included no evidence that Tilling had used the Democrat-prepared
documents.1°9
Finally, the Court addressed the district court's holding that "the plan
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it created legislative districts of
unequal size." 110 Although the plan included population deviations larger than
the ten percent which is routinely held to be permissible, the district court
failed to consider whether the deviations were justified by rational state
objectives, such as preserving political boundaries.11' Responding to the
district court's holding that deviations cannot be so justified, the Court stated
that "[o]ur case law is directly to the contrary." 112 The Court then remanded
the case to the district court for such a consideration.1 3
C. Shaw v. Reno
In its third reapportionment case of 1993, the Supreme Court was neither
unanimous nor approving of the challenged apportionment plan. In Shaw v.
Reno'14 Justice O'Connor, writing for a five to four majority, took a step back
from Voinovich's general approval of majority-minority district creation in a
challenge to North Carolina's 1990 congressional reapportionment.115
North Carolina, a section five state, 116 submitted a 1990 congressional
reapportionment plan that included one majority-minority (black) district to the
U.S. Attorney General for pre-clearance. 117 The Attorney General rejected the
plan, claiming that the North Carolina General Assembly "could have created a
second majority-minority district 'to give effect to black and Native American
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1158-59.





114 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
115 Id.
116 See supra notes 15-22.
117 113 S. Ct. at 2820.
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voting strength in this area.'" 118 Subsequently, the General Assembly enacted
a revised plan that included a second majority-minority district. 119 The shape
of the majority-minority districts became the focus of numerous articles in the
popular press and is the focus of Justice O'Connor's opinion:
The first of the . . . districts is somewhat hook shaped. Centered in the
northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow
band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southern-most
part of the State near the South Carolina border. [It] has been compared to a
"Rorschach ink-blot test," and a "bug splattered on a windshield."
The second .. . district . . . is even more unusually shaped. It is
approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the I-
85 corridor. It winds in snake-like fashion through tobacco country, financial
centers, and manufacturing areas "until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black
neighborhoods." Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find
themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade" districts when
they enter the next county. At one point the district remains contiguous only
because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing
over them. One state legislator has remarked that "'[i]f you drove down the
interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the
district.'" 120
Although the Attorney General approved North Carolina's revised plan, it
was challenged both on political and racial gerrymandering grounds. The
political gerrymandering claim, stated under Davis v. Bandemer,121 was
dismissed by the district court and affirmed on appeal by the Supreme
Court.122 The racial gerrymandering claim was stated under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and alleged that the majority-minority districts were
created such that "'black voters [were] concentrated arbitrarily-without regard
to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical
boundaries, or political subdivisions' with the purpose 'to create [districts]
along racial lines' and to assure the election of two black representatives to
Congress." 123 The district court dismissed the racial gerrymandering claim as
well, on jurisdictional grounds for certain of the defendants and generally on
the basis that race-based districting is nowhere prohibited by the
1 18 Id. (citation omitted).
119 Id.120 Id. at 2820-21 (citations omitted).
121 478 U.S. 109 (1986).





Justice O'Connor's opinion first recounted the Nation's sad history of
racial discrimination, especially with regard to voting rights, noting that "[it is
unsettling how closely the [challenged] North Carolina plan resembles the most
egregious racial gerrymanders of the past." 125  Justice O'Connor then
delineated the precise nature of the issue before the Court: whether
"redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without
sufficiently compelling justification" can serve as the basis of an Equal
Protection Clause claim. 126
Under the Court's "levels of scrutiny" analysis of Equal Protection claims,
"state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their
race" must "be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest." 2 7 "Strict scrutiny" applies not only to statutes that make explicit
racial classifications but also to those that cannot be rationally explained on
nonracial grounds, such as prior attempts to exclude black voters by imposing
literacy requirements that exempted whites via "grandfather clauses." 128 Thus,
an Equal Protection claim may rest on the ground that a reapportionment plan
was drawn solely on the basis of race.
The Court noted that, unlike most other state lawmaking, in the
reapportionment context state legislators are keenly aware of how the law
affects various racial groups. Sophisticated computer applications give
reapportionment bodies ready access to a variety of demographic information
about voters, including race, "age, economic status, religious and political
persuasion," and a variety of other factors.12 9 State legislatures may, when
members of a minority live together, create majority-minority districts
legitimately "to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions." 130
The Shaw opinion stresses that the so-called traditional apportionment
criteria of maintaining political subdivisons and grouping those with similar
demographic characteristics are not constitutionally mandated, but that these
factors may be used to defeat a claim of gerrymandering solely on racial
124 Id. at 2821-22.
125 Id. at 2824.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2825.
128 1l.




grounds. 131  That is, these other factors can serve as the compelling
government interest required for racial classifications to survive strict scrutiny.
Reapportionment solely on the basis of race, per the Court,
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid [and] reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls.... By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate
the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is
sometimes said to counteract. 132
Finding such perpetuating racial segregation to be "at war with the democratic
ideal," the Court found that the plaintiffs here stated a cognizable Equal
Protection claim and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
apportionment plan was narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest. 133
V. CONCLUSION
The unanimous Growe and Voinovich opinions thus reaffirm the primacy
of state government in the apportionment process and sanction the use of race
as an input in the apportionment equation. Shaw, however, adds a narrow
qualification to unfettered states' rights in designing apportionment plans:
districts cannot be drawn solely on the basis of race. A racial classification can
only be justified by compelling government interests, which may be provided
by including other factors in the apportionment equation.
The qualification established by Shaw is both illogical and unworkable in
application. The Court offers no analysis of how much other factors must be
considered in addition to race, but only that there be other factors. It is
inconceivable that a legislative apportionment body, now aware of the Shaw
holding, will fail to produce evidence of non-race factors in even the most
racially motivated apportionment. In addition, the Court's reliance on
unspecified and tradition-based factors (i.e. preservation of political
subdivisions) to overcome strict scrutiny analysis would, if applied to other
racial issues, make strict scrutiny much less "strict." Surely the Court would
not allow a similar unspecified rationale to overcome strict scrutiny in, say,
employment law. The problem is that strict scrutiny has no place here, in an
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area that is the proper province of unfettered state politics. So long as those
political processes do not violate the Voting Rights Act, the Court should defer
to them.
Sean P. Dunn

